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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




PETER YSKAMP; CIGNA CORP., in its individual capacity 
and in its capacity as subrogee to the rights and interest 
of Peter Yskamp, and in its capacity as subrogee to the 








       Petitioner 
 
On Review of a Decision of 
the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(RI-94-0015) 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 14, 1998 
 
Before: SLOVITER and COWEN, Circuit Judges, 
and OBERDORFER, District Judge* 
 
(Filed December 21, 1998) 
 
       John S. Hoff 
       Hoff & Garley 
       Chicago, IL 60603 
 
        Attorney for Petitioner 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Hon. Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Court for the District 




       Robert A. Zauzmer 
       Office of United States Attorney 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
        Attorney for Respondent 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant CIGNA Corp. ("CIGNA") seeks review of the 
1994 administrative forfeiture of a Lear jet by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). CIGNA contends that 
because the value of the aircraft seized exceeded $500,000, 
it was improper for the DEA to use administrative forfeiture 
instead of judicial forfeiture. Additionally, CIGNA raises 
several constitutional grounds for reversing the forfeiture. 





Peter Yskamp purchased the Lear jet in 1991 for use in 
a charter operation certified by the Federal Aviation 
Administration ("FAA"). James E. Haldan held a lien on the 
jet pursuant to a security agreement signed in August 
1991, a few days before Yskamp purchased the jet, but that 
agreement was not filed with the FAA (as required by law) 
until after seizure of the plane more than three years later. 
CIGNA insured the jet under a standard policy which was 
later amended at Yskamp's request to cover losses caused 
by war or confiscation. 
 
In September 1994, DEA officers who had become 
suspicious of the activities of certain suspects tracked them 
to the Bermuda Dunes airport in California. The suspects 
unloaded luggage from a truck into Yskamp's jet. After the 
suspects boarded the jet, the officers approached and 
requested permission to search it, which was granted. On 
board, the officers found 12 pieces of luggage containing 
300 kgs of cocaine. 
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When questioned afterwards, Yskamp conceded that this 
flight and a prior one with the same suspects were odd, 
because the bulk of the payment was in cash, the travelers 
had significantly more luggage in one direction than the 
other, and the turn-around time was short. Additionally, 
when questioned by the DEA, pilots for Yskamp stated 
initially (but later retracted when Yskamp was present) that 
they had informed him of their suspicions, and that he told 
them to ignore these concerns. 
 
Following the DEA's seizure of the jet, Yskamp filed a 
claim for loss with CIGNA, which CIGNA approved and paid 
under his amended insurance policy. As provided in the 
contract, CIGNA then became Yskamp's subrogee. CIGNA 
also paid the outstanding loan balance owed Haldan, even 
though Haldan was not named on the policy, and then 
claimed status as Haldan's subrogee, as well. Finally, by 
paying Yskamp's insurance claim, CIGNA became owner of 
the jet outright in addition to his subrogee. 
 
Pursuant to the administrative forfeiture provision in 19 
U.S.C. S 1607, the DEA mailed notices of seizure dated 
October 11, 1994, to Yskamp and Haldan. The mailed 
notices contained information on the first date set for 
public notice of the seizure, the appraised value of the 
property seized ($1 million), and the federal judicial district 
in which the seizure took place. The notices also explained 
that the party could post a $5000 bond and pursue judicial 
forfeiture proceedings as an alternative pursuant to the 
statute. 
 
Attorney John Scott Hoff (CIGNA's counsel here) notified 
the DEA of his representation of both CIGNA and Yskamp 
on October 11, 1994. Included with this notice was a 
petition for expedited release of the jet. The DEA then 
issued a notice of seizure addressed to Yskamp c/o Hoff as 
his attorney. CIGNA wrote to the DEA on November 15, 
1994, confirming its understanding that the DEA would 
proceed on the petition for expedited release and stating 
that CIGNA's decision whether to post bond was still 
pending. 
 
CIGNA failed to post the judicial bond and, on December 
16, the DEA administratively forfeited the jet. Several days 
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later, the DEA denied CIGNA's expedited release petition, 
but agreed to treat CIGNA's submission as a petition for 
discretionary mitigation or remission and agreed to CIGNA's 
filing of additional documentation for that purpose. 
 
Following the submission of additional information, the 
DEA denied the mitigation or remission petition. The DEA 
concluded, inter alia, that neither Yskamp nor CIGNA had 
taken reasonable steps to assure that the jet was not used 
for conveying illegal drugs. CIGNA filed a petition for 
reconsideration of the forfeiture based on the DEA's failure 
to consider CIGNA's status as subrogee of Haldan's 
interest. The DEA denied that petition in August 1996. 
 
In September 1996, CIGNA, together with Yskamp, timely 
filed in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit a Joint 
Petition for Review of the DEA's order of forfeiture. The 
court dismissed the claims of Yskamp as well as those of 
CIGNA as subrogee of both Yskamp and Haldan for lack of 
jurisdiction, reasoning that Yskamp was not an aggrieved 
party, and that Haldan was merely an unsecured creditor 
with whom CIGNA had no relationship creating 
subrogation. The court then transferred the remainder of 
the case to this court on jurisdictional grounds pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1631. CIGNA pursues review of the forfeiture on 
its own behalf as owner of the jet. 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. S 877. We will 
set aside the agency's determination only if it is arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. S 706(2); Humphreys v. 
DEA, 96 F.3d 658, 660 (3d Cir. 1996). However, appeal 
from a petition for remission or mitigation is limited to 
assuring that the DEA complied with statutory and 
procedural requirements. See Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 
1402, 1412 n.9 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Kravitz, 738 
F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he remission decision of 
the Attorney General is not open to judicial review."); see 
also Marshall Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 893 F.2d 1096 
(9th Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's jurisdiction to 
consider collateral attack on DEA's selection of 
administrative forfeiture). Thus, despite CIGNA's invitation, 
we will not review de novo the merits of the DEA's 
conclusion that CIGNA was not entitled to return of the jet. 
 




The principal issue in this appeal is a pure question of 
law and depends on statutory interpretation. At issue is 
whether the DEA must use the procedures for judicial 
forfeiture, rather than for administrative forfeiture, if the 
value of the object seized because it was transporting a 
controlled substance exceeds $500,000. To address the 





The statutory procedures for civil forfeiture applicable to 
the DEA and other agencies, such as the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, appear at 19 U.S.C.S 1606 
et seq. The current provisions reflect the comprehensive 
revision made to the federal forfeiture statutes in 1984. 
Before the 1984 amendments, S 1607, which authorizes 
administrative forfeiture, provided: 
 
       S 1607. Seizure; value $10,000 or less 
       If such value of such vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or 
       baggage does not exceed $10,000, the appropriate 
       customs officer shall cause a notice of the seizure of 
       such articles and the intention to forfeit and sell or 
       otherwise dispose of the same according to law to be 
       published for at least three successive weeks in such 
       manner as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct. 
       For the purposes of this section and sections 1610 and 
       1612 of this title merchandise the importation of which 
       is prohibited shall be held not to exceed $10,000 in 
       value. 
 
19 U.S.C. S 1607 (1982). In contrast, S 1610, which 
authorizes judicial forfeiture, stated: 
 
       S 1610. Seizure, value more than $10,000 
       If the value of any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or 
       baggage so seized is greater than $10,000, the 
       appropriate customs officer shall transmit a report of 
       the case, with the names of available witnesses, to the 
       United States attorney for the district in which the 
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       seizure was made for the institution of the proper 
       proceedings for the condemnation of such property. 
 
19 U.S.C. S 1610 (1982).1 
 
Thus, the statute required an agency seeking forfeiture of 
property to use judicial process whenever the value of the 
property exceeded $10,000. For property appraised at or 
below $10,000, the agency could use administrative 
procedures, and these procedures required public notice of 
the intended action. A party claiming an interest in 
property that was subjected to administrative forfeiture 
could opt for a judicial proceeding by notifying the seizing 
agency and posting a bond, both within a specified period 
from the date of first public notice. 19 U.S.C.S 1608.2 
 
The 1984 amendments reworded these sections, 
increased the dollar cutoff, and slightly altered the process.3 
While the dual forum approach to forfeiture remained, 
Congress added a provision directing that in addition to the 
public notice already required, the interested parties be 
given personal notice. 
 
The relevant sections of the statute, as amended in 1984, 
provided: 
 
       S 1607. Seizure; value $100,000 or less, prohibited 
       merchandise, transporting conveyances 
       (a) If-- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The operative text for both of these statutory sections went 
essentially 
unchanged from their first enactment in 1930 until 1984, except for 
increases in the threshold amount, which had started at $1000. 
 
2. Section 1608 operates today essentially as it did in 1930 except for 
amendments to the bond amount. Today, that bond value is ten percent 
of the property's value or $5000, whichever is less, but not less than 
$250. A party losing in a forfeiture proceeding also is liable for the 
costs 
of the proceeding. 
 
3. Congress enacted comprehensive revisions to the relevant forfeiture 
laws twice that session. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, SS 311-319, 98 Stat. 2040, 2053-56 (1984); Trade and Tariff Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-573, S 213, 98 Stat. 2948, 2984-88 (1984). Although the 
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act did not have a designated effective date, 
the forfeiture provisions in the Trade and Tariff Act became effective on 
October 15, 1984. See S 214(e), 98 Stat. at 2989. 
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        (1) the value of such seized vessel, vehicle, aircraft, 
       merchandise, or baggage does not exceed $100,000; 
        (2) such seized merchandise is merchandise the 
       importation of which is prohibited; or 
        (3) such seized vessel, vehicle, or aircraft was used to 
       import, export, transport, or store any controlled 
       substance; 
 
       the appropriate customs officer shall cause a notice of 
       the seizure of such articles and the intention to forfeit 
       and sell or otherwise dispose of the same according to 
       law to be published for at least three successive weeks 
       in such manner as the Secretary of the Treasury may 
       direct. Written notice of seizure together with 
       information on the applicable procedures shall be sent 
       to each party who appears to have an interest in the 
       seized article. 
 
       1610. Seizure; judicial forfeiture proceedings 
       If any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage 
       is not subject to section 1607 of this title, the 
       appropriate customs officer shall transmit a report of 
       the case, with the names of available witnesses, to the 
       United States attorney for the district in which the 
       seizure was made for the institution of the proper 
       proceedings for the condemnation of such property. 
 
19 U.S.C. SS 1607, 1610 (1988). 
 
The upper limit on subsection (a)(1) forfeitures was raised 
to $500,000 in 1990, and a separate monetary instruments 
category (codified at S 1607(a)(4)) was added. 
 
The 1984 amendments effected a major change in the 
statute from one that authorized administrative forfeiture 
only if the property fell below a fixed appraised value to one 
that also authorized administrative forfeiture of certain 
categories of properties based on the type of property or the 
reason for forfeiture regardless of the property's appraised 
value. In fact, the House Conference Report accompanying 
the 1990 amendment, which added the monetary 
instruments category (a)(4), noted that the addition of 
subsection (a)(4) removes the dollar limit in uncontested 
cash seizures and also observed that "[t]here is no value 
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limit on conveyances that contain illegal drugs." H. Conf. 
Rep. No. 101-650 at 112, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
989, 1002. Thus, Congress recognized that S 1607 
contained distinctly separate categories of property for 
administrative forfeiture purposes. 
 
To summarize, the four distinct categories of property 
subject to administrative forfeiture under the forfeiture 
statute are: (1) certain property valued at or under $500,000;4 
(2) merchandise that may not be imported; (3) vehicles, 
aircraft, and vessels used to transport drugs; and (4) 
monetary instruments. Only the first category, that in 
S 1607(a)(1), has a dollar threshold. Judicial forfeiture is 
required if the property does not fall into any of the four 
categories. S 1610. Significantly, a party may convert an 
administrative forfeiture to a judicial proceeding by posting 




In light of this historical background, we turn to CIGNA's 
contentions. First, CIGNA argues that federal law requires 
the DEA to use judicial forfeiture proceedings any time the 
value of the property seized exceeds $500,000, and that 
because the DEA failed to use judicial forfeiture to seize the 
jet, it violated CIGNA's constitutional rights. 
 
CIGNA relies on dictum in Marshall Leasing, Inc., 893 
F.2d at 1102-03 n.6, which CIGNA reads to suggest that 
the 1984 amendments increasing the dollar threshold for 
triggering judicial forfeiture to $100,000 applies to all 
property. Indeed, notwithstanding that the 1984 revision 
explicitly distinguished, for purposes of administrative 
forfeiture, between property seized below a fixed dollar 
value and certain classes of property subject to 
administrative forfeiture irrespective of the dollar value (a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The threshold amount applies to individual items seized, not to the 
aggregate value of all items seized. See In re One 1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d 
1317, 1322 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 
5. Because CIGNA failed to post the necessary $5000 bond for its 
$950,000 jet, it was not entitled to judicial forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. 
S 1608. 
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distinction carried over to the 1990 amendments), many 
courts have continued to refer to property generally without 
acknowledging that distinction. See, e.g., Weng v. United 
States, 137 F.3d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1998); Ibarra v. United 
States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997); Litzenberger v. 
United States, 89 F.3d 818, 819-20 (Fed. Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1217 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 510 (1st Cir. 1995); 
Linarez v. United States Dept. of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 209 
(7th Cir. 1993); Schrob, 948 F.2d at 1412 n.9. We note that 
these statements, however, are mere dicta. Several cases 
have recognized the statutory distinctions. See Arango v. 
United States Department of the Treasury, 115 F.3d 922, 
925 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) (grouping all property together 
in text while specifying in footnote different categories of 
seizure); United States v. Idowu, 74 F.3d 387, 394 & n.10 
(2d Cir. 1996) (enumerating four categories of property 
administratively forfeitable after notice). 
 
We rely on the plain language of the statute to hold that 
S 1607 creates four distinct classes of property subject to 
administrative forfeiture. With the statute so understood, it 
is apparent that CIGNA cannot prevail on its argument that 
SS 1607 and 1610 required the DEA to use judicial 
forfeiture to forfeit the airplane at issue. The DEA found 
300 kgs of cocaine on the seized jet, which was being used 
to transport the drugs. The property therefore falls under 
S 1607(a)(3) as an aircraft transporting drugs, and is not 
subject to the $500,000 threshold. Thus, the DEA did not 
abuse its discretion in using administrative forfeiture. 
 
As an alternative argument, CIGNA asserts that the 
DEA's own regulations require the use of judicial 
proceedings. See 21 CFR S 1316.71 et seq. A review of those 
regulations shows that they track substantially the 
forfeiture statute. They define "property" generally to mean 
"a controlled substance, raw material, product, container, 
equipment, money or other asset, vessel, vehicle, or aircraft 
within the scope of the Act." S 1316.71(c). The "property" to 
be forfeited must be appraised, see S 1316.74; 19 U.S.C. 
S 1606 (requiring appraisal of vessels, vehicles, aircraft, 
merchandise, or baggage); and if the property's "appraised 
value does not exceed the [statutory] monetary amount . . .; 
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is [a] monetary instrument . . .; or . . .[is] a conveyance 
used to . . . transport or store any controlled substance," 
then the DEA must publish a public notice, S 1316.75, 
which is a prerequisite for administrative forfeiture under 
19 U.S.C. S 1607. 
 
CIGNA focuses on the language of S 1316.78, stating that 
if the appraised value exceeds "the jurisdictional limits in 
1316.75(a)," the DEA must use judicial forfeiture, and the 
language of S 1316.77, stating that the DEA may pursue 
administrative forfeiture for property that "does not exceed 
the jurisdictional limits in S 1316.75(a)." It argues that the 
phrase "jurisdictional limits in S 1316.75(a)" applies to all 
categories of property set forth in the regulation's 
definitional section.6 It is apparent, however, that by 
pursuing administrative forfeiture of the jet, the DEA 
interprets the regulation to incorporate the statutory 
distinctions in S 1607, so that the "jurisdictional limits" 
phrase of S 1316.77 and .78 refers only to property for 
which S 1607 of the statute imposes a dollar threshold. This 
is consistent with the congressional intent that property 
used in transporting controlled substances be subject to 
administrative forfeiture. 
 
CIGNA suggests no reason why the DEA, the agency in 
the forefront of drug interdiction, would do any less than 
Congress. Moreover, the DEA was aware that under the 
statute all that is required to invoke judicial forfeiture 
proceedings is the posting of a bond. We are obliged to 
defer to the DEA's interpretative application of these 
regulations when, as here, it is neither plainly erroneous 
nor inconsistent with the regulation. See Shell Oil Co. v. 
Babbitt, 125 F.3d 172, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In conclusion, we hold that the DEA was not obligated 
under the federal forfeiture statutes or regulations to 
pursue judicial forfeiture merely because the value of the 




6. This interpretation is articulated in CIGNA's reply brief, which the 
DEA has not had an opportunity to answer. 
 




CIGNA raises several constitutional arguments against 
the forfeiture of the jet. First, it claims that the forfeiture is 
violative of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 
excessive fines. See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602 
(1993). In United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 
(1998), the Supreme Court analyzed whether a criminal 
forfeiture of $357,144 sought by the government was 
grossly disproportionate to the crime and, therefore, 
punitive and excessive. It stated that although a court 
should defer to the decision of the legislature regarding the 
appropriateness of the forfeiture, id. at 2037, the statute is 
not conclusive. Because Bajakajian's offense involved only 
a willful failure to report the export of currency in amounts 
at or over $10,000, see 18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1), and was not 
associated with any other related crimes, such as tax 
evasion, drug trafficking, or money laundering, see 
Bajakajian, 118 S.Ct. at 2036, 2038, the Court rejected as 
excessive the government's demand for the entire amount. 
 
Even before the Bajakajian opinion, this court was 
moving toward a proportionality test for forfeiture cases, 
both civil and criminal. See, e.g., United States v. Sarbello, 
985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing criminal RICO 
forfeiture). In United States v. Premises Known as RR #1, 14 
F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1994), there was a question whether the 
property at issue was in fact used "to facilitate" violation of 
the drug laws, a prerequisite for civil forfeiture. Id. at 876. 
We stated that if that nexus were proven, then the trier of 
fact would be required to look at the overall circumstances, 
including seriousness of the offense and personal benefit or 
culpability, to decide excessiveness. Id. at 875 (citing 
Sarbello, 985 F.2d at 724). 
 
We conclude that the forfeiture here was not excessive. 
The federal statute clearly authorized the forfeiture of 
aircraft used in the transportation of drugs. The amount of 
cocaine to be transported in the jet was comparatively large 
for a drug case. Indeed, an offense involving 150 kgs or 
more of cocaine has been placed in the highest base offense 
level under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. 
S 2D1.1(c). Furthermore, the DEA found CIGNA culpable 
because it failed to assure that the jet was not used for 
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improper purposes. CIGNA has not contended that it had 
no duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent Yskamp's 
use of the airplane for illegal cargo. The DEA noted that 
CIGNA's insurance policy reimbursed a claimant even 
though the property seized was used in illegal drug 
trafficking, which effectively insulated criminals from the 
loss consequences of their crimes. Consequently, the 
forfeiture of the jet does not violate the constitutional ban 
on excessive fines. 
 
CIGNA's other constitutional arguments are equally 
meritless. On its Fifth Amendment claims, there is no 
question that CIGNA's counsel was aware of the forfeiture 
proceedings and could have acted to preserve the 
company's rights to a judicial forfeiture by submission of a 
$5,000 bond, but he failed to do so in a timely manner. 
CIGNA has not pursued an argument that it must receive 
personal notice, as opposed to the notices counsel received 
on behalf of Yskamp and Haldan. CIGNA's reliance on 
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 
43 (1993), for the proposition that it deserves a hearing is 
misplaced. That case required notice and a hearing before 
the government may seize real property, not personal 
property. We decline to extend Good's reach in this case. 
 
CIGNA has not challenged the use of administrative 
forfeitures generally, only the use of administrative 
forfeiture instead of judicial forfeiture in this case. Because 
we have concluded that the DEA's administrative forfeiture 
was permissible here, and authorized by statute, we need 
not address CIGNA's Sixth and Seventh Amendment 
arguments. 
 
Finally, CIGNA raises, apparently for the first time, an 
argument that the jet was not subject to forfeiture because 
it served as a common carrier under 21 U.S.C. S 881(a)(4). 
However, even that exception requires that the owner 
neither consent nor be willfully blind to the property's use 
in transporting drugs. Id. Even were we to disregard our 
precedent and consider this claim in the first instance, see, 
e.g., Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 
106, 111-13 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining review of issue not 
considered by agency in the first instance), which we are 
not inclined to do, the DEA found that CIGNA failed to 
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prevent the jet's use in transporting illegal drugs, which 
would render that exception inapplicable. CIGNA offers no 




In conclusion, we will deny CIGNA's Petition for Review. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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